Stampede, Inc., and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah v. John R. Kimball and Industrial Commission of Utah: Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Stampede, Inc., and/or Workers Compensation
Fund of Utah v. John R. Kimball and Industrial
Commission of Utah: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
T. Jeffery Cottle; Alan L. Hennebold; Industrial Commission of Utah; Counsel for Respondents.
James R. Black; Carrie T. Taylor; Barbara W. Sharp; Workers Compensation Fund of Utah; Co-
Counsel for Petitioners.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Stampede, Inc v. Kimball, No. 950815 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/7041
UTAH COURT rr 
L 
UTAH 
C 
XS 
l v -
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GO 
A10 
DOCKET NO. 
STAMPEDE, INC., and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
Petitioners, 
JOHN R. KIMBALL and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
* 
* 
* 
Reply Brief of Petitioners 
Stampede Trucking and Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 950815-CA 
Industrial Commission 
Case No. 94967 
Priority 7 
* * * * * * * * * 
WRIT OF REVIEW FROM AN ORDER OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Counsel for Respondents 
T. Jeffery Cottle 
387 West Center 
Orem, UT 84057 
(801) 222-9700 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
JAMES R. BLACK, #0347 
James R. Black, P.C. 
349 South 200 East, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)531-6737 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P O Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(801) 530-6953 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
CARRIE T. TAYLOR, #6045 
BARBARA W. SHARP, #6984 
Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
(801) 288-8149 
AUG 2 ^ 1QQR 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STAMPEDE, INC., and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
Petitioners, 
JOHN R. KIMBALL and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Reply Brief of Petitioners 
Stampede Trucking and Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 950815-CA 
Industrial Commission 
Case No. 94967 
Priority 7 
* * * * * * * * * 
WRIT OF REVIEW FROM AN ORDER OF 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Counsel for Respondents 
T. Jeffery Cottle 
387 West Center 
Orem, UT 84057 
(801) 222-9700 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
JAMES R. BLACK, #0347 
James R. Black, P.C. 
349 South 200 East, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)531-6737 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P O Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(801) 530-6953 
Co-Counsel for Petitioners 
CARRIE T. TAYLOR, #6045 
BARBARA W. SHARP, #6984 
Workers Compensation Fund of 
Utah 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
(801) 288-8149 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
I. ARGUMENT 1 
A. EVIDENCE NOT IN THE RECORD BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
CANNOT NOW BE ADDED FOR CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL . . . 1 
B. THE COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF RULE R568-1-4.J. WAS 
VAGUE, NON-UNIFORM, UNJUSTIFIED AND CONSTITUTES AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION 2 
C. KIMBALL'S RECEIPT OF DR. KNORPP'S REPORT ONE DAY PRIOR 
TO THE HEARING DOES NOT CREATE AN "EXCEPTIONAL" 
CIRCUMSTANCE TO JUSTIFY RAISING THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS 
INITIALLY ON APPEAL 3 
II. CONCLUSION 4 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE AUTHORITIES 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994) 1 
Jacobellis v. Ohio. 378 U.S. 184, (1964) 2 
State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) 3 
State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993) 4 
State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990) 3 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 
1989) 1 
ii 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. EVIDENCE NOT IN THE RECORD BEFORE THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CANNOT BE ADDED FOR 
CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL. 
To support his argument regarding the prejudicial effect of 
the submission of Dr. Knorpp's report, Kimball incorrectly cited 
to and included evidence in his brief which was not contained in 
the record before the Industrial Commission. (Kimball Brief at 9-
10, 18, Appendix B). Likewise, the Industrial Commission 
inappropriately relied upon and cited this evidence in its 
statement of facts and in its concurrence with Kimball!s argument 
on prejudicial effect (Commission Brief at 4-5,12). 
It is well-settled law that this Court is limited to an 
appellate review of only evidence contained in the record 
properly before the trial court in its proceedings below. 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 698 n.3 (Utah App. 
1994); Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452, 455-
56 (Utah App. 1989)(citing Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 
Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah App. 1987)). In Baird. this 
Court refused to admit a deposition that had not been introduced 
to the trial court, declaring that "we consider only facts 
properly before the trial court, notwithstanding that both 
parties to this action repeatedly cite to Baird's deposition in 
their appellate briefs." 781 P.2d at 456. 
This principle applies equally to the quasi-judicial 
administrative proceedings in the case at bar. Accordingly, 
evidence not available to the Commission, either in the 
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evidentiary hearing before the ALJ or to the Commissioners during 
their review process, cannot now be introduced, cited to and 
relied upon to support countervailing arguments on appeal made by 
both Kimball and the Commission itself. 
B. THE COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF RULE R568-1-
4.J. WAS VAGUE, INCONSISTENT, UNJUSTIFIED AND 
CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Notwithstanding the Commission's authority to promulgate 
rules which govern the manner in which it conducts its 
proceedings, it abused its discretion in applying Rule R568-1-4.J 
in the instant case. The Commission, in its Order, noted that 
"under appropriate circumstances, the requirements of the rule 
may be relaxed," yet failed to articulate just what these 
circumstances are and why these circumstances were not met in the 
case of Dr. Knorpp's report.1 (WCF Brief Appendix C at 2; R at 
470). The rule on its face does not provide for such exceptions, 
and notably, does not provide sanctions for noncompliance. As a 
matter of fundamental fairness, WCF is entitled to know exactly 
what the exceptions and sanctions of the rule are so that it may 
act in accordance to the rule and understand the consequences for 
not doing so. 
Further, the Commission contends that its suggestion of a 
continuance as a means to cure untimeliness under Rule 568-1-4.J 
would be proper only if requested in advance of the hearing 
!Surely the Commission should not resort to something akin to 
the Supreme Court's famous test for pornography, i.e., "I know it 
when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
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(Commission Brief at 11). However, even an advance request for 
continuance, made in every instance that medical records were 
delayed, would still be a burden on the administrative system and 
a hardship upon a distant out-of-state applicant. 
C. KIMBALL'S RECEIPT OF DR. KNORPP'S REPORT ONE 
DAY PRIOR TO THE HEARING DOES NOT CREATE AN 
"EXCEPTIONAL" CIRCUMSTANCE TO JUSTIFY RAISING THE 
ISSUE OF TIMELINESS INITIALLY ON APPEAL. 
Kimball incorrectly relies on the "exceptional" or "unusual 
circumstances" exception, State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 925 
(Utah App. 1991), to the general rule barring appellate review of 
issues that had not been raised at the trial level. While this 
exception is widely recognized by Utah appellate courts, the 
conditions which comprise Kimball's exceptional circumstances 
fail to meet the courts' limited application of this exception. 
In a case analogous in issue to the case at bar, this Court 
held that the appellant cannot raise the issue of statutory 
noncompliance with a search warrant in order to suppress 
evidence. State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990). "In 
this case, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the 
statutory noncompliance ground now asserted by Webb was unknown 
or unavailable to him before or at trial." Webb. 790 P.2d at 78 
(emphasis added). Thus, according to Webb absent exceptional 
circumstances such as grounds unknown or unavailable at trial, 
statutory noncompliance cannot be first raised on appeal. 
Similarly, Kimball is attempting to raise the issue of timeliness 
based on noncompliance with an administrative rule in order to 
exclude Dr. Knorpp's report, after having failed to do so at the 
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evidentiary hearing despite an extensive discourse on the 
admissibility of this report based on other grounds. Certainly 
both the ALJ and Kimball knew of Rule R568-1-4.J, yet both did 
not consider the issue of timeliness vis a vis admissibility. 
Furthermore, Kimball erroneously contends that his mention 
of "late" and "too little too late" was sufficient to constitute 
raising the issue at the evidentiary hearing (R. at 483, 486; WCF 
Brief Appendix E at 11, 14). This Court has held that "for an 
issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it must at 
least be raised to a level of consciousness such that a trial 
judge can consider it." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 361 
(citations omitted) (Utah App. 1993). A careful reading of 
Kimball's discussion and the ALJfs ensuing reaction to Dr. 
Knorpp's report indicates that the issue of timeliness was not 
considered or even acknowledged by the ALJ. Instead, the ALJ 
focused exclusively on the fact that this report represented a 
second independent medical examination and that it was a file 
review without an actual examination of Kimball. 
II, CONCLUSION 
There are no "exceptional circumstances" present in this 
case that would enable Kimball to raise the issue of timeliness 
when he had not done so at the evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, 
Kimball and the Industrial Commission have improperly relied on 
evidence that is not part of the record below. 
However, the ultimate error lies with the Industrial 
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Commission itself. Its application of Rule 568-1-4.J, with 
vague, unstated exceptions, constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, WCF respectfully requests this Court reverse 
the decision of the Industrial Commission, admit Dr. Knorpp's 
report, and remand this case back to the Industrial Commission 
for a medical panel referral. 
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